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Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence 
from China  
 
Abstract:  
 This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from 
cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent 
governance rules and a better investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong 
companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based 
compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong local firms in 
adopting strong executive incentives?   The evidence from this study suggests that top 
executive compensation of cross-listed firms is more sensitive to sales growth than 
mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to that of Hong Kong firms, 
executive pay of cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns.  Further study 
shows that it is necessary to differentiate state and non-state companies among the 
cross-listed firms, as they exhibit different patterns of executive incentives.  
Key words:   Cross-listing      Executive Compensation    Corporate Governance 
JEL code: J3, M5 
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1. Introduction  
Cross-listing refers to the case where a firm lists its shares on one or more foreign 
stock exchanges in addition to the domestic exchange. Cross-listing may be motivated 
by the opportunity to raise capital from global investors or by the market consideration 
that cross-listing may help the firm to increase visibility in the foreign market. Recent 
studies point out another important motivation for cross-listing, the so-called “bonding” 
explanation. Coffee (1999) was among the first to propose that firms incorporated in a 
country with a less developed stock market can creditably bond themselves by cross 
listing their shares in a more developed foreign stock market.  
So far, empirical evidence on the “bonding” hypothesis is mostly based on 
studies of companies listed in the U.S. For examples, Doidge (2004) finds that cross 
listing is associated with lower private benefit of control; Bauer et al. (2004)  find that 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. have higher corporate governance ratings than firms 
without a U.S. cross listing; other studies suggest that cross-listing in the U.S. brings 
advantages such as better valuation, lower cost of capital, more scrutiny by financial 
analysts, and greater access to external finance  (Doidge et al. 2004; Hail and Leuz 2006; 
Lang et al. 2003, 2006; Reese and Weisbach, 2002).   
However, there are also studies challenging the “bonding” hypothesis. Licht 
(2001, 2003) questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in enforcing the U.S.’s more stringent corporate governance rules on 
foreign firms. In supportive of this view, Siegel (2005) found that the SEC’s 
enforcement on Mexican firms cross-listed in the U.S. was generally weak. Furthermore, 
Licht (2003) argues that firms may actually go cross listing to avoid strict requirements 
in domestic markets, consisting of the so-called “avoiding hypothesis”.  
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There are several other countries (e.g., Hong Kong), which boast similar levels 
of investor protection as the U.S., and also receive an increasing and significant number 
of cross listings. Hong Kong is the first choice of Chinese companies looking for oversea 
listing. In the last decade, over 200 Chinese firms have undertaken initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in the Hong Kong Stock Market, accounting for almost one fourth of all 
the firms listed in Hong Kong.  These companies are either known as “Red Chip” or 
“H-share”. A mainland-China controlled company incorporated and listed in Hong 
Kong is called a “red chip” company; the word red comes from “red China”. Red chips 
are traded in Hong Kong dollars, and financial statements are also reported in the same 
currency. H-share companies are incorporated in the mainland and approved by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to list in Hong Kong; the letter H 
stands for Hong Kong. H-share companies are traded in Hong Kong dollars, but 
financial statements are reported in RMB Yuan. Recently, the distinctions between 
H-shares and red chips have become blurred. Many mainland-incorporated companies 
are issued as red chips, such as China Mobile, China Insurance and China National 
Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC). Thus, similar to many other studies, this paper treats 
H-share and red chip as one group. 
Although Hong Kong has returned to China since 1997, Hong Kong’s economic 
and political system in general and, security markets, in particular, remain independent 
from the mainland. Hong Kong Security and Future Commission (SFC) is the regulatory 
body in charge of listed companies in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In mainland 
China, there are two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen respectively. 
Companies listed in these two stock exchanges may offer “A shares” to domestic 
investors and “B shares” to foreign investors. The two stock exchanges and listed 
companies are regulated by the CSRC.  
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The Company Law of China, enacted in 1994 and latest amended in 2006, 
established general corporate governance rules for listed companies. The Company Law 
is further supplemented by the specific rules issued by the CSRC.  The policies and rules 
in the mainland are generally viewed as more immature and fragmented than those in 
Hong Kong (World Bank, 2002). An example lies in the specification of independent 
directors and executive compensation committee on the board. The CSRC requires that 
only one third of directors be independent, and that independent directors take up their 
responsibility seriously in important company matters such as executive appointment 
and compensation, auditing and information disclosure.1 In comparison, the Hong Kong 
SFC has detailed regulations, which require not only majority of directors be 
non-executive and independent, but also the most important board committees such as 
the auditing and executive remuneration committees have to comprise all 
non-executives directors. 2    
Empirical studies find that only a small fraction of A-share companies have 
established the executive compensation committee on the board, and the effectiveness of 
the committee is questionable; for those without the committee, the situation is worse 
and executives often set their own salary (Firth et al., 2006b); HK companies, on the 
other hand, has generally introduced the executive remuneration committee, and the 
committee is composed of non-executive directors or experts from the outside, and is 
often more independent than the board in general (Ho, 2003). Some researchers have 
suggested that the problem of executives of A-share companies colluding with large 
state shareholders in expropriating minority investors is quite serious (Jian and Wong, 
2004; Jiang et al., 2005); others have also questioned the quality of financial disclosure 
and independency of external auditing of A-share companies (Bao and Chow, 1999; 
                                                 
1 CSRC “Advice on Establishing the Independent Director System in Listed Companies”, 2001[102] 
2 SFC, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/aboutsfc/corporate/governance/governance.html 
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DeFond et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2005). Overall, after examining creditor right, investor 
right, the rule of law, and corruption, Allen et al. (2005) deem that Hong Kong is among 
the countries with the best investor protection such as the U.S., U.K., Japan, Singapore, 
and Germany, whereas mainland China, ranked similar to Mexico and Indonesia, was 
considered to have a poorer investor protection. Similarly, CLSA (2002) ranks Hong 
Kong number two in the annual Asian corporate governance ranking, and mainland 
China number sixteen. 
 Since Hong Kong appears to have more stringent governance rules and a better 
investor protection than mainland China, executive pay of Hong Kong firms is often 
more sensitive to company performance than that of mainland companies. The question 
is whether cross-listed companies have learned from Hong Kong local firms in linking 
executive pay to performance. The stronger executive incentives adopted by cross-listed 
companies may be the result of the improvement after the cross-listing, or simply due to 
the “selection effect”, i.e. only those companies that have better conditions are allowed 
to get listed in Hong Kong. We cannot disentangle these two effects. Our focus is to test 
whether the overall effect of cross-listing on executive incentives is positive. The feature 
of our study is that we set two benchmarks for Chinese companies cross-listed in Hong 
Kong: one is mainland A-share companies; the other is Hong Kong local companies. 
The comparison of these three groups reveals whether cross-listed companies have 
caught up with Hong Kong companies or still lag behind, and also whether cross-listed 
companies have shown improvement over mainland companies.  
Our study is most closely related to Ke et al. (2008) who compared mainland 
companies cross-listed in Hong Kong to those without a HK cross-listing in terms of the 
sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance. However, there are several 
important differences between this paper and Ke et al. (2008). First, our study includes 
an additional comparison between cross-listed companies and Hong Kong local 
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companies. Second, and more importantly, Ke et al. (2008) limit the executive 
compensation analysis to 2003, while we manage to obtain the executive compensation 
data for mainland, cross-listed, and Hong Kong companies for years 2004-2006. Thus, 
we are able to estimate the change regressions, whereas, with one year data, Ke et al. 
(2008) estimated only the level regression.  The advantage of the change regression lies 
in the control of unobserved firm-specific characteristics. The omission of these 
variables in the level regression causes bias in the estimates. In the change regression, 
the unobserved firm-specific characteristics drop out after first differencing. Third, 
before 2004, there was no data on individual executive compensation, and hence Ke et al. 
(2008) used the total compensation of the three or five highest paid executives and 
directors in a company for year 2003. 3  Using 2004-2006 data, we employ the 
individually disclosed executive compensation in the analysis. 
Our work also benefits from previous studies that have investigated extensively 
the relationship between executive pay and firm performance of A-share companies, 
such as Firth et al. (2006a, b), Kato and Long (2006), Aivazian et al. (2005), Mengistae 
and Xu (2004). In methodology, we follow Kaplan (1994) who compared the sensitivity 
of top executive reward to firm performance of Japanese companies with that of the U.S.  
 Our findings are mixed. When firm performance is measured by stock returns 
and sales growth, executive compensation is more sensitive to performance in 
cross-listed companies than mainland companies without cross-listing. Overall, the 
difference between cross-listed companies and Hong Kong local companies are 
insignificant, but it could be due to large standard errors. Simple eyeballing shows that in 
terms of linking executive pay to firms’ sales growth, cross-listed companies have 
caught up with Hong Kong local companies, but in terms of incentives tied to stock 
                                                 
3 For mainland companies, the total compensation of the three highest paid executives was disclosed 
before 2004, while for Hong Kong companies, that of the five highest paid executive was disclosed. 
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returns, cross-listed firms still lag behind. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
section 2 describes data, sample selection, and variables; section 3 presents the results 
and section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
2. Data  
  The dataset used in this study consists of panel data of mainland, cross-listed and 
HK companies from year 2004 to 2006. For HK-listed companies, before 2005 (fiscal 
year 2004), executive compensation was broken down into bands of HK$500,000 
beginning at HK$1,000,000, and the number of directors whose total remuneration falls 
into each band was disclosed; after 2005, the exact amount of compensation is required 
to be disclosed. Since the bandwidth is rather broad, the compensation data of HK 
executives have a relatively large measurement error before fiscal year 2004. Therefore, 
we use data from 2004 to the latest available year 2006.  For mainland listed companies, 
the disclosure requirement for executive compensation has been rather consistent over 
time: the compensation is also reported in intervals, but the width of the interval is 
relatively small, 10,000 RMB Yuan or less.   To keep consistency, we select the data of 
the same years for mainland- and HK-listed companies. The HK-listed include both HK 
local companies and cross-listed mainland companies. As the end of December 2004, 
there were 114 H-share and 88 red chip firms listed in Hong Kong.  Thus, the sample of 
cross-listed companies consists of these 202 companies. 
To compare cross-listed companies to mainland and Hong Kong companies, we 
construct the sample of A-share companies that match with the cross-listed companies in 
industry and size, and the sample of similarly matched HK local companies. The 
primary reason we select the industry- and size-matched samples is because industry and 
size are two most important factors that impact firm performance and executive 
compensation. The other reason is the data collection burden. Financial, market and 
 9
executive compensation figures of mainland firms, disclosed by individual companies in 
their annual reports, have been coded and put into database by data consulting 
companies such as GTA, CSMAR, and GTI. Financial and market data of Hong Kong 
companies are available from Datastream. However, compensation and firm 
characteristics data of cross-listed and Hong Kong companies have to be hand-picked 
from company statements. There are over 1000 listed companies in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Hand-picking data for all the companies for all three years is an enormous job. 
For this reason, we decide to first limit the sample by industry and size, and then pick the 
data from company reports for the smaller sample.  
  Detailed process of matching is as follows: the industry type of cross-listed 
companies (H-shares and Red chips) is obtained from Datastream. For each of the 202 
cross-listed companies, we first select A-share firms of the same industry based on the 
industry classification code of CSRC, 4  and then we identify the one company that is 
closest in sales revenue and assets. Sales revenue and assets are used as the indicators of 
firm size. In this way, we obtain the matched sample that contains 202 mainland 
companies. The sample of HK local companies is constructed following the similar 
process as mentioned above.  For each of the cross-listed companies, one HK local 
company that is in the same industry based on the industry code of Datastream and is 
closest in sales revenue and assets is selected. The final sample contains 202 matched 
local HK companies. Thus, we have obtained three samples: 
Mainland:  Mainland firms without HK cross listing. The sample size is 202. We use 
letter “A” to indicate this sample.   
                                                 
4  CSRC has classified industries into 13 categories including agriculture and forestry; mining; 
manufacturing; utility (water, gas, and electricity manufacturing and supply); construction; transportation 
and storage; information technology; wholesale and retail; finance and insurance; real estate; social 
service; media and culture; and integrated (multi-industry).   
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Cross-listed: Mainland companies traded in Hong Kong, including Red Chips and 
H-share companies.  The sample size is 202; we use “HR” to denote this sample. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong local firms incorporated and traded in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The sample size is 202. “HK” is used to denote this sample.  
 Executive compensation and firm characteristics data of mainland companies are 
obtained from GTA, and those of cross-listed and HK local companies are hand picked 
from financial statements obtained from the website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(www.hkex.com.hk). The final dataset contains information on the following variables: 
Cash compensation is the sum of an executive’s annual salary and bonus in RMB 10,000 
Yuan. Since for mainland companies executive compensation is reported in intervals, 
the exact compensation figure is replaced by the median of the corresponding interval. 
To be consistent, we convert the compensation of executives of cross-listed and HK 
companies to RMB Yuan based on the exchange rate. We take the logarithm of Cash 
Compensation and calculate the difference between year t and t-1, and name the new 
variable Change in cash compensation. Management shareholding is defined as the total 
shares held by the top three executives of a company at the end of year t, as disclosed in 
the company’s financial statements.  
There are several variables to measure firm performance: Market value of equity 
is the total market value of tradable shares at the fiscal year end and the unit is RMB 
million Yuan; Stock return is annual stock return from the first month of fiscal year t to 
the end of the fiscal year, adjusted for dividends; Sales is net sales revenue for the fiscal 
year t , also in RMB million Yuan; Sales growth is the change in the logarithm of sales 
from year t -1 to t;  ROA is net income divided by total asset. To overcome the extreme 
values, we winsorize sales growth and ROA to the range of [-20, 20]. Change in ROA is 
the change in ROA from year t-1 to t; Loss is a dummy variable that equals one if net 
income in year t or t-1 is negative.  
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The dataset also contains a few variables that characterize a company’s 
governance structure: Ownership concentration is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder; State is a dummy variable that equals one if the largest shareholder 
is the state. In addition, Years of listing refers to the number of years since a firm was 
listed until December 31, 2007. 
Table 1 shows financial performance, executive compensation, and ownership 
structure of mainland, cross-listed, and HK companies. To avoid extreme values, we use 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test of differences in median for continuous variables and 
report Z-values. For dummy variables, Chi-Square frequency tests are used to test the 
differences, and Chi-square statistics are reported. The top panel shows that executives 
of HK firms earned the average compensation of 4.8 million RMB Yuan per year during 
2004-2006 (the median is 2.5 million Yuan), nearly 15 times that earned by executives 
of mainland  firms (10 times the median). Executives of cross-listed companies received 
an average cash compensation of 1.8 million Yuan (median = 0.77), which is 
significantly higher than that earned by mainland executives but lower than that earned 
by HK executives. However, executives in cross-listed companies received a larger 
increase in cash compensation during 2004-2006, compared to their counterparts in 
mainland and HK firms. The average annual increase in compensation is 16 percent for 
cross-listed companies as opposed to 7 percent for HK and mainland firms.   
 The top panel also shows that top three executives of HK firms own 42 percent 
of their firm’s stock, while their peers in mainland firms own only 0.01 percent.  
Executives of cross-listed companies have a slightly higher percentage of shares than 
those of mainland companies, but a much lower percentage than those of HK firms.   
From this perspective, financial incentives offered to executives in cross-listed 
companies are more similar to those in mainland companies than to those of HK firms. 
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Executives of cross-listed firms are still mostly motivated by short-term cash 
compensation rather than stock ownership or options.  
The middle panel (panel B) of Table 1 shows companies’ performance by 
various measures. The average equity value and sales revenue is much larger for 
cross-listed companies than for mainland and HK firms. A few large firms among 
cross-listed companies, such as PetroChina, China Eastern Airlines and Huaneng Power, 
are leading companies of major industries, which may bias the average value for 
cross-listed firms. In comparison, the median value of equity and sales of the three 
groups of companies is more similar, except that HK firms are, on average, a little 
smaller.  
Both cross-listed and HK companies outperform mainland companies in stock 
returns and ROA. The differences between HK and cross-listed firms in these two 
performance indices are small and statistically insignificant. Cross-listed companies had 
an average sales growth of 22 percent (18 percent at the median), which is the largest 
among the three groups of companies. On the other hand, mainland companies had the 
lowest percentage of Loss: 22 percent of the companies had a negative net income in the 
previous two years compared to 23 percent for cross-listed companies and 29 percent for 
HK companies.  The frequency of Loss between mainland and cross-listed companies is 
not significantly different. For both companies, this frequency is substantially lower 
than that of HK companies. In summary, the evidence is rather mixed as to which firms 
have the best performance: HK companies perform the best in stock returns and ROA; 
cross-listed companies have the strongest sales growth; mainland companies have the 
lowest percentage of Loss; the three groups do not differ significantly in the change of 
ROA. 
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The bottom panel shows other characteristics of firms. An important indicator of 
a company’s governance structure is concentration of shareholding. Table 1 shows that 
cross-listed companies have the most concentrated shareholding structure, followed by 
HK companies and then by mainland companies. Overall, the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder is rather high for all the three groups of companies. The 
tabulation also shows that for 76 percent of mainland companies, the largest shareholder 
is the state, while for HK companies, that percentage is zero. Among 202 cross-listed 
companies, 82 percent is state-controlled.  Finally, HK companies in general have been 
listed longer than mainland and cross-listed companies. Descriptive results, so far, have 
shown that the executive compensation level of cross-listed companies lies between that 
of mainland and HK companies. The question remains whether executive compensation 
of cross-listed companies is more or less tied to firm performance than those of mainland 
and HK firms.   
3. Regression Results  
To examine the question, we estimate the following regression: 
0 1 2 1 3   .it it it itChange in Cash Compensation Performance Performance Xβ β β β ε−= + + + +
 
We adopt four measures of firm performance: (1) stock returns; (2) sales growth; (3) 
change in ROA; (4) Loss. As can be seen, the measures indicate the change in the 
performance. In addition, the first variable is an external market performance measure 
while the rest are internal accounting performance measures.   Following Kaplan (1994), 
we also include one-year lagged value of stock returns, sales growth and changes in 
ROA to capture any lagged effect of firm performance on executive compensation. Since 
Loss indicates a negative net income in either or both of the previous two years, the 
lagged value of Loss is not necessary. We estimate the model, entering the four 
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performance measures separately as well as including them all together. itX  are other 
firm characteristics included in the regression as control variables. We also include year 
dummy variables to control for year fixed effects. 
 We estimate the above equation for mainland, cross-listed, and HK companies 
separately and report coefficient estimates of 1β  and 2β in Table 2. The left-hand side of 
Table 2 shows the estimates for each performance measure with separate adjusted R2 
reported. The right-hand side reports the estimates when all the performance variables 
and their lagged values are included. To test whether the estimates differ significantly 
between the three groups of firms, we also use the joint sample of mainland and 
cross-listed firms, and the joint sample of mainland and HK firms, and also that of 
cross-listed and HK firms. For each joint sample, we estimate the regression including 
the interaction of performance with a group indicator (the other group is left out as the 
reference group). The estimates of the interaction terms, tPerformance group×  
and 1tPerformance group− × , are tested for significance separately (t-test) and also 
jointly (F-test). The results are reported in Table 2. 
  Several important points emerge from Table 2: first, there seems sufficient 
evidence to suggest that executive compensation of HK firms is more sensitive to stock 
returns than that of cross-listed and mainland firms. This finding is no surprise since HK 
top executives tend to hold a much higher percentage of the company’s shares than 
executives of mainland and cross-listed firms. Also, many mainland firms owned by the 
state have a large block of non-tradable shares that distort market price, and therefore 
mainland firms tend to place less emphasis on stock price as a performance indicator. It 
also appears that in terms of executive incentives tied to stock returns, cross-listed 
companies are more similar to mainland companies than to HK companies. This result 
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suggests that cross-listing in a more developed and less distorted stock market did not 
alter executive incentive schemes of mainland companies.  
 Second, cross-listed firms have exceeded HK companies in the responsiveness of 
compensation changes with respect to sales growth, and both of them have overtaken 
mainland companies. Once all performance variables are included in the regression (as 
shown in the right column of table 2), the increase in executive compensation of HK 
companies is still significantly related to sales growth, and the difference between 
mainland companies and firms listed in HK is significant.  
Third, the estimates of the sensitivity of executive compensation to the change in 
ROA are positive and sizeable for all three groups of firms.   However, the coefficient for 
ROA becomes insignificant in the presence of sales growth and Loss dummy for 
mainland and cross-listed companies. This suggests that the variation in ROA is driven 
by the correlation of ROA with sales growth and Loss. As a result, the comparison 
between groups did not produce significant patterns.  
Finally, despite being less sensitive to stock returns and sales growth than that of 
cross-listed and HK firms, executive compensation of mainland firms is more sensitive 
to Loss. This result may be partially due to the strict rules imposed by the CSRC on 
profitability. According to regulations of the CSRC, A-share companies incurring losses 
for two consecutive years will be put under special treatment (ST). The companies with 
losses for three consecutive years face the risk of delisting. 
 Since ownership structure may have a strong impact on executive incentives, we 
also conduct the analysis to control for the effect of ownership type. Descriptive results 
in Table 1 show that the three groups of companies have a similar level of shareholding 
concentration. Therefore, our focus is rather on the type of the largest shareholder, 
specifically whether it is private or the state. For mainland and cross-listed companies, 
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we estimate separate regressions when the largest shareholder is the state and when it is 
private. We also test the differences between these two cases. Since HK firms are all 
private, there is no need for separate regressions for them. The results are reported in 
Table 3.    As can be seen, among mainland companies, executive compensation is more 
sensitive to changes in ROA in state companies than in non-state companies, whereas in 
the non-state executive pay is more sensitive to Loss.  This result is likely due to the 
different evaluation and incentive system for executives in state and non-state 
companies. In many cases the government still evaluates state companies based on their 
total profits and taxes paid (Tenev et al., 2002). Among cross-listed companies, state and 
non-state firms are similar in terms of the responsiveness of executive compensation to 
stock returns, changes in ROA, and Loss, but are different in the response to sales 
growth; state companies that are cross-listed are more sensitive to sales growth than 
non-state companies.     
In any case, Table 3 suggests the necessity to distinguish state and non-state firms 
in the analysis. For this reason, we conduct more tests of differences and report the 
results in Table 4. We compared mainland state firms with cross-listed state firms and 
HK firms, as well as mainland non-state with cross-listed non-state and HK firms. These 
results show that, the earlier results in Table 2, suggesting executive compensation of 
cross-listed companies is very sensitive to sales growth, is actually mostly driven by the 
behavior of state firms, while executive compensation of mainland companies being 
sensitive to Loss is mainly because of private firms. Nevertheless, mainland state 
companies are shown to be particularly responsive to changes in ROA when setting 
executive compensation.  
As a whole, our result is different from Ke et al. (2008) who found that for non-state 
controlled firms, the pay for performance sensitivity is stronger for cross-listed 
companies than for mainland companies, while the sensitivity for state controlled firms 
 17
is not significantly different from that of mainland counterparts. Our results, on the other 
hand, indicate that for non-state companies, the difference between cross-listed and 
mainland companies is insignificant, while for state companies, the differences are 
significant. There are several possible reasons for the disparity between our results and 
those of Ke et al. (2008). One lies in the sample year. Ke et al. (2008) used 2003 data 
only, while we use 2004-2006 data.  In both mainland and Hong Kong markets, the 
corporate governance rules and executive compensation have been changing in the past 
several years, therefore, it is not surprising to find different results for different years. 
The other is related to the measurement of compensation. As mentioned before, the 
exact amount of compensation of HK executives is not available until year 2004. Ke et al. 
(2008) used the total cash compensation of the five highest paid executives in a company; 
we use the individual executive compensation. Lastly, we estimate the change regression 
while Ke et al. (2008) estimate the level regression. The different specifications could 
also contribute to different results.  
4. Summary and Conclusion  
 In conclusion, we found that mainland companies cross-listed in HK exhibited 
different patterns of responses of executive compensation to firm performance from 
mainland firms without cross-listing and also different from HK firms. Executive 
compensation of cross-listed firms is more sensitive to sales growth than that of 
mainland firms, while it is less sensitive than HK firms to stock returns. When state and 
non-state firms are separately examined, it is among cross-listed state firms that 
executive compensation is responsive to sales growth, whereas among cross-listed 
private companies the incentives tied to sales growth are not so much different from the 
companies without cross-listing. Moreover, among mainland companies, we find that 
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executive compensation is particularly sensitive to the change in ROA in state 
companies while sensitive to Loss in private companies.  
These results point to some evidence supportive of the hypothesis that 
cross-listing is associated with a stronger linkage between executive compensation and 
firm performance. The hypothesis is supported when performance is measured by sales 
growth and only for state companies. Moreover, persistent differences are found 
between state and non-state companies in terms of which performance measure carries 
the most weight in determining executive pay, except that neither companies put much 
weight on stock returns.  
 19
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Table 1 Descriptive results 
Sample Group   A    HR    HK   Test of differences 
Variables  Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N Mean Median STD N HR>A HK>A HK>HR 
A. Compensation              
Cash compensation  33.75 25.06 37.38 590 180.90 77.30 384.35 551 479.31 249.14 745.41 536 16.98*** 26.41*** 14.16*** 
Change in cash 
compensation   0.07 0.06 0.39 387 0.16 0.11 0.51 349 0.07 0.02 0.45 327 2.43*** -1.77* -3.64*** 
Management shareholding  0.01 0  0.03 528 10.64 0.07 20.76 554 42.05 47.77 22.86 543 13.61*** 20.79*** 11.88*** 
                 
B. Financial Status                 
Market value of equity  3923.38 2099.78 6640.20 602 15075.85 1566.02 73976.52 586 9226.57 903.42 27148.77 590 3.65*** 8.26*** -2.85*** 
Stock returns  0.11 -0.05 0.57 605 0.26 0.05 0.83 553 0.31 0.09 0.94 583 3.77*** 5.60*** 1.59 
Sales  3629.84 1554.79 6810.24 596 18297.66 2014.11 74895.80 590 4872.29 1150.83 14338.71 605 2.53*** 4.35*** -6.19*** 
Sales growth  0.09 0.14 1.18 596 0.22 0.18 0.84 589 0.09 0.08 0.77 605 3.01*** 2.91*** 5.61*** 
ROA  0.00 0.02 0.16 597 0.03 0.04 0.13 584 0.02 0.04 0.96 601 6.63*** 4.83*** 1.23 
Change in ROA  -0.01 0  0.14 597 0  0  0.50 583 -0.03 0  4.24 601 1.35 -0.58 -1.54 
Loss  0.22 0  0.41 597 0.23 0  0.42 584 0.29 0  0.45 601 0.31 8.80*** 5.77*** 
                 
C. Other Characteristics                 
Ownership Concentration  49.94 40.70 190.93 528 50.82 52.72 17.90 554 47.24 49.76 18.28 543 8.18*** 4.91*** -2.99*** 
State  0.76 1  0.43 570 0.82 1 0.38 595     7.98***   
Years of listing  11.14 10.63 2.58 202 11.20 10.17 7.96 202 14.31 13.67 7.63 202 -3.61*** 5.20*** 6.14*** 
Note: *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively. For continuous variables, Wilcoxon signed rank test of differences in median is used.  For dummy variables, 
Chi-Square frequency test is used to test the differences. 
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Table 2  Pay-performance sensitivity for three groups 
 Individual Performance Variables Test of differences  All Performance Variables Test of differences 
Independent variables    A  HR HK  A<HR  A<HK HR<HK   A  HR HK  A<HR  A<HK HR<HK 
A. Stock return              
    Stock return, t .099***  .091*** .061**  †(-)   0.065** 0.074** 0.061** †   
 (3.25) (2.69) (2.06)     (2.21) (2.21) (2.14)    
    Stock return, t-1 0.052 0.008 .105***     -0.015 -0.075 0.092***  †  
 (0.78) (0.09)  3.28)     (-0.23) (-0.80) (2.90)    
    Adj- 2R  .040  .042  .044           
 B. Sales growth     †            
    Sales growth, t .017* .133* .047 †    0.005 0.174*** 0.067* †  †(-) 
 (1.95) (1.92) (1.25)     (0.62) (3.01) (1.94)    
    Sales growth, t-1 .115*** 0.071 .101***     0.049 0.142*** 0.110*** †   
  (2.90) (1.31) (2.81)     (1.27) (3.14) (3.50)    
     Adj- 2R  .040 .037 .033           
C. Change in ROA              
    Change in ROA, t .484** .219 .016***  †(-)   0.302 0.218 0.021***    
 (2.23) (0.76) (15.13)     (1.34) (0.84) (10.36)    
    Change in ROA, t-1 .149 .154* .004***     -0.114 0.107 0.008***    
 (0.46) (1.69) (5.18)     (-0.43) (1.38) (5.64)    
    Adj- 2R  .040 .024 .022           
D. Loss              
    Loss, t or t-1 -.177*** -.136*** -.092** †    -0.141*** -0.100* -0.052    
 (-3.27) (-2.60) (-2.02)     (-2.54) (-1.67) (-1.11)    
    Adj- 2R  .054 .031 .012     .085 .095 .101    
Observations 382 309 310     382 309 310    
Note:  The number in parenthesis is t-value of parameter. *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  † indicates the difference between groups is significant at the 10% 
or lower level; (-) indicates the sign is opposite to the assumed direction.  
 
 23 
Table 3  Pay-performance sensitivity of state and non-state, A and HR companies  
    A       HR    
  Test of difference  Test of difference   Test of difference   Test of difference
Independent variables State  Non-state
State>Non-
state State  Non-state
State>Non- 
state  State  Non-state
State>Non-
state  State  Non-state
State>Non- 
state 
A. Stock return               
    Stock return, t 0.089*** 0.113  0.055* 0.024   0.090** 0.072   0.065  0.038  
 (2.59) (1.31)  (1.72) (0.26)   (2.20 (1.48)   (1.61) (0.56)  
    Stock return, t-1 0.101 -0.099  -0.021 -0.217   0.045 -0.094   -0.026) -0.173  
 (1.27) (-0.71)  (-0.28) (-1.37)   (0.51 (-0.59)   (-0.27 (-1.04)  
    Adj- 2R  .040 .074      0.053 .041      
 B. Sales growth          †     
    Sales growth, t 0.051 0.017**  0.056 0.008   0.369*** -0.007 †  0.348*** 0.076 † 
 (0.54) (2.34)  (0.66) (1.45)   (3.65 (-0.05)   (3.31) (0.46)  
    Sales growth, t-1 0.158** 0.073  0.074 0.023   -0.014 0.048   0.039 0.136  
  (1.97) (1.64)  (1.08) (0.37)   (-0.33 (0.32)   (0.77) (0.83)  
     Adj- 2R  .038 .089      .091 .023      
C. Change in ROA   †            
    Change in ROA, t 1.666** 0.347*** † 1.499** 0.162 †  0.241 -0.034   0.279 0.124  
 (2.38) (3.03)  (2.23) (1.29)   (0.74) (0.05)   (1.10 (0.14)  
    Change in ROA, t-1 1.822*** -0.315 † 1.534** -0.396* †  0.144* 0.291   0.076 -0.091  
 (2.60) (-1.18)  (2.21) (-1.94)   (1.72) (0.64)   (1.07 (-0.11)  
    Adj- 2R  .094 .112      .032 .004      
D. Loss               
    Loss, t or t-1 -0.160*** -0.221***  -0.044 -0.257** †  -0.149*** -0.110   -0.107* -0.126  
 (-2.12) (-2.29)  (-0.68) (-2.12)   (-2.80) (-0.64)   (-1.89 (-0.45)  
    Adj- 2R  .038 .133  .121 .095   .040 .009   .140 .101  
Observations 275 85  275 85   262 47   262 47  
Note: The number in parenthesis is t-value of parameter. *, **, and *** indicates the significance level at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  † indicates the difference between groups is significant at the 10% 
or lower level; (-) indicates the sign is opposite to the assumed direction.  
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Table 4 Tests of difference in pay-performance sensitivity for A, HR, and HK, by State 
  Individual Performance Variables    All Performance Variables  
Independent  
variables 
A-state< 
HR-state 
A-state 
< HK 
HR-state
<HK 
A-non-state< 
HR-non-state
A-non-state 
<HK 
HR-non-state
<HK  
A-state< 
HR-state
 A-state 
< HK
HR-state 
<HK 
A-non-state< 
HR-non-state
 A-non-state 
<HK 
HR-non-state 
<HK 
A. Stock return              
    Stock return, t  †      †(-) †     
              
    Stock return, t-1            † † 
              
 B. Sales growth †    †         
    Sales growth, t †  †(-)     †  †(-)  †  
              
    Sales growth, t-1   †  †         
               
C. Change in ROA †(-) †(-)            
    Change in ROA, t †(-) †(-)   †(-)   †(-) †(-)   †  
              
    Change in ROA, t-1 †(-) †(-)      †(-) †(-)   †  
              
D. Loss              
    Loss, t or t-1 †(-)           †  
              
Observations              
Note:   † indicates the difference is significant at the 10% or lower level; (-) indicates the sign is opposite to the assumed direction. 
 
 
 
